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Abstract
The current emphasis of the research in learning theory is on the study of inductive
learning (from examples) of concepts (binary classications of examples). The work in
AI identies other tasks, such as reasoning, as essential for intelligent agents, but those
are not supported by the current learning models. The Learning to Reason framework
was devised to reconcile inductive learning and ecient reasoning. The framework
highlights the fact that new learning questions arise when learning in order to reason.
This paper addresses the task of deductive reasoning, and investigates learning to reason
problems in which the examples seen are only partially specied.
The paper presents several interpretations for partial information in the interface with
the environment, and develops model based representations and reasoning algorithms
that are suitable to deal with partially observable worlds. Then, learning to reason
algorithms that cope with partial information are developed. These results exhibit a
tradeo between learnability, the strength of the oracles used in the interface and the
expressiveness of the queries asked.
This work shows that one can learn to reason with respect to expressive worlds, that
cannot be learned eciently in the traditional learning framework and do not support
ecient reasoning in the traditional reasoning framework.
1 Introduction
The study of learning is motivated by the belief that a learning component must have a central
role in any system capable of performing high level cognitive tasks. The current emphasis of

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the research in learning theory is on the study of inductive learning (from examples) of concepts
(binary classications of examples). In this framework the performance of the learner is measured
when classifying future examples and we therefore call this the Learning to Classify approach. The
theoretical research in this direction, originating from the seminal work of Valiant (1984) has already
proved useful in that it had contributed to our understanding of some of the main characteristics of
the learning phenomenon and has contributed to applied research on classication tasks (Druker,
Schapire, and Simard, 1993).
However, the goal of developing an understanding of how learning supports other high level
cognitive tasks is still not within reach. Several such tasks, including language understanding, high
level vision and planning, have been widely interpreted as tasks that rely on performing some sort
of inference. A basic inference task considered in this context is that of deductive inference, which is
usually modeled as follows: given a propositional expressionW , represented as a conjunction of rules
and assumed to capture our knowledge of the world, and a propositional query  that is supposed
to capture the situation at hand, decide whether W logically implies  (denoted W j= ). Early
theories of intelligent systems have assumed that these inference tasks can be studied separately
from learning. However, in the current frameworks, learning and reasoning algorithms cannot be
combined in a straightforward way. For example, even if we could learn the set of rules W , we
cannot use the outcome to eciently perform deductive reasoning with the query . This task
requires solving satisability for W ^ , a task that is believed to be computationally intractable.
The Learning to Reason framework was introduced in (Khardon and Roth, 1994a) to address
the abovementioned problems. On one hand, inspired by the pac-model of learning, it argues that
a central question to consider is how the intelligent system acquires its knowledge and how this
process, of interaction with its environment, inuences the performance of the reasoning system. On
the other hand, it highlights the fact that new learning questions arise, and should be addressed if we
want to learn in order to reason. The Learning to Reason approach combines the interfaces to the
world used by known learning models with the reasoning task and a performance criterion suitable
for it. In this framework the intelligent agent is given access to its favorite learning interface, and is
also given a grace period in which it can interact with this interface and construct a representation
KB of the world W . The reasoning performance is measured only after this period, when the agent
is presented with queries  from some function class, relevant to the world, and has to answer
whether W implies . It is shown in (Khardon and Roth, 1994a) that a learning algorithm that
is aimed at providing good classication behavior does not, in general, facilitate reasoning tasks.
At the same time it is shown that in the Learning to Reason approach, through interaction with
the world, the agent truly gains additional reasoning power over what is possible in the traditional
setting. In particular, cases are presented where learning to reason about the world is feasible but
either reasoning from a given representation of the world or learning representations of the world
do not have ecient solutions.
In this paper we extend the Learning to Reason framework to study the case in which the
interaction with the environment is via partial observations. These interactions are more realistic,
but received little attention in learning theory mainly since they become more important when
learning in order to reason. (Valiant's (1984) paper and several recent papers discussed in Section 3
are notable exceptions.) When learning to reason one cannot assume that examples include an
assignment of values to all the attributes in the world, as is reasonable when learning to classify,
in tasks such as character recognition. Rather, the information perceived provides only partial
information on the state of the world. For example, when sitting in a windowless lecture hall one's
senses do not supply any information about the weather. Clearly, some, but possibly not all of the
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missing information may be relevant to the task at hand.
The agent interacts with the world when learning its environment and when responding to
queries. In the latter stage, the interaction is partial in the sense that a query usually species and
inquires about a small fraction of the world's attributes, inducing a natural way to restrict the type
of queries considered. In this paper we concentrate on the interaction in the learning phase. In this
stage the learner is exposed to partial information in the form of examples which are not totally
specied. We discuss a few ways in which partial examples can be interpreted, including cases
where unobserved attributes are irrelevant, and cases where unobserved attributes are arbitrarily
(and possibly adversarially) hidden from the learner. The goal of the learner is to reason about this
partially observable world. Namely, to answer (deductive) reasoning questions about the world it is
interacting with. As in the original work on Learning to Reason (Khardon and Roth, 1994a), it is
shown here that Learning to Reason can be achieved even in cases where the traditionally phrased
reasoning problem is intractable, and when the traditionally phrased learning problem { learning
a representation of the world (a concept) { is intractable.
Our positive results use a model based approach to reasoning (Kautz, Kearns, and Selman, 1995;
Khardon and Roth, 1994b). In this approach, the agent keeps a collection of (partial) examples
as a knowledge base, and the reasoning task is performed simply by evaluating the queries on this
set of models. The need to study these knowledge representations arises from the intractability of
reasoning with the standard formula-based representations. We show that such knowledge bases are
useful for the deduction task considered here and moreover, that they can be learned, thus producing
a system that learns in order to reason. We also prove an impossibility result on learning to reason,
for cases in which the class of queries asked are too expressive, and discuss the tradeos between
the strength of the oracles used and the positive results that can be shown.
While in this paper we concentrate on deductive reasoning, the learning to reason approach
should be seen in a more general context and can be applied for a variety of tasks. In particular,
a dierent treatment of partial information is taken in (Valiant, 1995; Roth, 1995), where the
eect of partially specied queries is discussed. A similar learning to reason approach is developed
there, supporting several aspects of \non-monotonic reasoning" (Reiter, 1987) which have proved
dicult to capture in other frameworks. The Learning to Reason approach has also been extended
to consider several other tasks, including some forms of default reasoning, learning in order to act
in the world, and learning of active classiers (Khardon and Roth, 1995; Khardon, 1996; Greiner,
Grove, and Roth, 1996).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We start by presenting some preliminaries on
reasoning in Section 2 and then introduce our notion of partial observations in Section 3. In
Section 4 we formally dene the Learning to Reason model. Section 5 develops ideas on knowledge
representations and reasoning procedures required to cope with partially observable worlds. Section
6 presents the Learning to Reason algorithms. We conclude in Section 7 with a summary.
2 Reasoning
The generally accepted framework for the study of reasoning in intelligent systems is the knowledge-
based system approach (McCarthy, 1958; Nilsson, 1991). It is assumed that the knowledge is given
to the system, stored in some representation language with a well dened meaning assigned to
its sentences. The sentences are stored in a Knowledge Base (KB) which is combined with a
reasoning mechanism, used to determine what can be inferred from the sentences in the KB. There
are many knowledge representations that can be used to represent the knowledge in a knowledge-
based system. Dierent representation systems (e.g., a set of logical rules, a probabilistic network)
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are associated with corresponding reasoning mechanisms, each with its own merits and range of
applications. The most basic reasoning task considered is that of logical deduction. In this case,
reasoning is abstracted as the task of determining whether a query , assumed to capture the
situation at hand, is implied from our knowledge of the world as expressed in KB (denoted KB
j= ). Traditionally, mainly for comprehensibility reasons, the knowledge representation used in
these tasks is that of a conjunction of rules, namely a CNF representation.
However, computational considerations render the traditional reasoning approach as well as
other variants of it not adequate for common-sense reasoning. This is true not only for the task of
deduction, but also for many other forms of reasoning which have been developed, partly in order
to avoid the computational diculties in exact deduction and partly to meet some (psychological
and other) plausibility requirements. All those were shown to be even harder to compute than the
original formulation (Selman, 1990; Papadimitriou, 1991; Roth, 1996). As a consequence, a lot of
recent work in reasoning aims at identifying classes of limited expressiveness, with which one can
perform some sort of reasoning eciently (Levesque and Brachman, 1985; Cadoli, 1995; Levesque,
1992; Selman, 1990). However, none of these works meets the strong tractability requirements for
common-sense reasoning (as described, for example, in (Shastri, 1993)), even though, (as argued,
for example, in (Doyle and Patil, 1991)) the representation is sometimes restricted in implausible
ways.
Moreover, the question of how the knowledge base might be acquired and whether this should
inuence how the performance of the reasoning system is measured is normally not considered.
While the central role of learning in cognition is acknowledged by many, most lines of research
nevertheless study reasoning phenomena separately from learning phenomena. The assumption
is that \Learning can be added later". That is, the separate study of reasoning and learning
phenomena will eventually be combined to produce intelligent behavior (see discussion in (Kirsh,
1991)). Indeed, very few works have considered the question of integrating theories of reasoning
and learning in any formal way. As pointed out earlier, computational considerations show that
learning and reasoning algorithms cannot be combined in a straightforward way. Other examples
for this phenomenon, which do not rely directly on the computational hardness of reasoning, can
also be given (Khardon and Roth, 1994a).
Motivated by the above observations, the Learning to Reason framework, suggesting a way to
integrate the learning and reasoning tasks, has been developed (Khardon and Roth, 1994a). This
is extended in this work to the study of Learning to Reason in the presence of partial observations
in the learning stage.
2.1 Formal Denition of the Reasoning Task
We consider problems of reasoning where the \world" (the domain in question) is modeled as a
Boolean function
1
W : f0; 1g
n
! f0; 1g. Similarly, the knowledge base KB consists of some
representation for a Boolean function. Note that we make a distinction between KB and W : KB is
the representation used by the algorithm, whereas the reasoning performance is measured relative
to W
Let f; g be any Boolean functions. An assignment x 2 f0; 1g
n
is a model (satisfying assignment)
of f if f(x) = 1. By \f entails g", denoted f j= g, we mean that every model of f is also a model
of g. We also refer to the connective j= by its equivalent, proof theoretic name, \implies". Since
1
This is equivalent to the denition in terms of propositional expressions. A propositional expression is just a
representation for a Boolean function, and a propositional language is a class of representations for Boolean functions.
These terms are used in the reasoning and learning literature respectively, and we use them interchangeably.
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\entailment" and \logical implication" are equivalent, we can treat f either as a Boolean function
(usually, using a propositional expression that represents the function), or as the set of its models,
namely f
 1
(1). Observe that the connective \implies" (j=) used between Boolean functions is
equivalent to the connective \subset or equal" () used for subsets of f0; 1g
n
. That is, f j= g if
and only if f  g. Let F ;Q be two propositional languages.
Denition 2.1 An algorithm A is an ecient and exact reasoning algorithm for the reasoning
problem (F ;Q), if for all f 2 F and  2 Q, when A is presented with input (f; ), A runs in time
polynomial in n and the size of f and , and answers \Yes" if and only if f j= .
Answering the question f j=  is equivalent to solving unsatisability for the formula f ^ .
Thus, when f is given as a CNF, exact reasoning can be done eciently only when satisability can
be solved eciently (e.g., Horn expressions). We note that, a DNF representation for f , although
better on computational grounds, has been less favored mainly for comprehensibility reasons. (Since
a representation as a set of rules easily translates to a CNF but not to a DNF expression.)
The assertion f j=  means that if some model x 2 f0; 1g
n
satises f , then it must also satisfy
. This motivates the following model based approach to solving the deduction problem. Let
   f  f0; 1g
n
be a set of models. To decide whether f j= , check, for all the models z 2  ,
whether (z) = 1. If for some z, (z) = 0, say \no"; otherwise say \yes".
By denition, if   = f this approach yields correct deduction, but representing f by explicitly
holding all the possible models of KB is not plausible. As shown in (Kautz, Kearns, and Selman,
1995; Khardon and Roth, 1994b), under some restrictions, it is sucient to consider only a small
set of models. Our results use this approach to reasoning, and we discuss this issue further in
Section 5.
3 Partial Observations
Consider an agent who is wandering around the world gathering information about its environ-
ment. We assume the agent interacts with the world via a set of measurements it can make and
some predicates it can compute from these measurements. We think of these measurements and
predicates as a set of binary attributes and consider a set X = fx
1
; : : : ; x
n
g of variables, each of
which is associated with a world's attribute and can take the values 1 or 0 to indicate whether the
associated attribute is true or false in the world. While at each point in time the agent can take
measurements, in general it would not be possible to observe all the attributes at all times. Thus,
while some attributes may be known to be true or false others may not be observed. We denote
this situation by assigning the value  to such attributes, so that the input an agent sees is a partial
assignment to the n variables { an assignment in f0; 1; g
n
. For example, v = (1  0) means that
x
1
is true, x
3
is false, and the value of x
2
is unknown. An assignment is total if the value of every
variable is known (i.e., assigned value from f0; 1g). An assignment y is an extension of x if y agrees
with x on all the variables assigned 0 or 1 in x (and where variables assigned  in x may be assigned
0 or 1 in y).
We start by discussing several interpretations for the information conveyed by partial obser-
vations. Recall that we model the world as a Boolean function W : f0; 1g
n
! f0; 1g, where the
intention is thatW (x) = 1 if and only if x corresponds to a combination of features which is possible
in the world. There are various ways to interpret the meaning that an observation v 2 f0; 1; g
n
conveys on W . In particular:
1. Universal interpretation: For all possible extensions of v to total models v
0
, W (v
0
) = 1.
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2. Existential interpretation: There exists an extension of v to a total model v
0
, such that
W (v
0
) = 1.
3. Abbreviated interpretation: The partial model v is just a short way to write the total
model v
0
dened by v
0
i
= v
i
, for all i such that v
i
= 1, and v
0
i
= 0, otherwise. Thus W (v) = 1
means that W (v
0
) = 1, for the v
0
dened above.
In the following we assume that one of the above interpretations has been chosen, and is xed for
the entire duration of the learning scenario. In such a case we can evaluate a Boolean function on
a partial assignment according to this interpretation. We denote this by using a subscript to mark
the interpretation chosen. Namely, f
u
(f
e
, f
a
) means that the function f is evaluated according to
the Universal (Existential, Abbreviated) interpretation.
Several works have dealt with partial observations in the context of concept learning. The
approach (1) is taken by Valiant (1984) to model an agent that observes all the attributes that are
relevant for the classication of the learned concept. (That is, when one is learning about chairs,
the color of the sky at that moment is irrelevant.)
The approach (3) is useful when the total number of attributes n is much larger than the
number of positive attributes any one example has, and an example is presented as a list of its
positive attributes. Concept learning in this model is studied in (Blum, 1992; Blum, Hellerstein,
and Littlestone, 1991).
For the task of learning a \world" representation in order to reason about it later, it seems that
the agnostic approach, the existential interpretation (2), ought to be taken. A motivating scenario
is that of an agent who is wandering around in the world, but can perceive at any instance only a
limited number of attributes. The agent has no control on the perceived attributes, nor can it tell
if all the \important" attributes have been perceived. This situation can be modeled by having
someone \hide" some of the attributes in an example. As we show later even with this agnostic
interpretation some positive results can be achieved.
Several other works have studied partial assignments in the context of learning to classify but
used dierent assumptions on the interface of the agent with the environment. In (Ben-David and
Dichterman, 1993) it is assumed that the agent can select the attributes it perceives. In (Hancock,
Greiner, and Rao, 1994; Greiner, Grove, and Kogan, 1996) it is assumed that a helpful teacher
blocks all the attributes which are irrelevant for classifying an example, thus making the learning
task easier. Since the interface and the task considered in both models are dierent from ours,
the results are not directly comparable. Naturally, however, these learning results can be used for
Learning to Reason tasks when the output representation supports ecient reasoning.
Schuurmans and Greiner (1994) consider a consistent \blocking process" that hides some of
the attributes of a randomly drawn example. In this way their interface is \existential" but makes
more assumptions on the missing variables. This approach is also close to ours in the sense that
the learning task is to learn \default rules", for the purpose of reasoning with them later. The
reasoning stage, however, is not considered, and presumably is performed by a traditional reasoner,
and is thus intractable. In recent work Valiant (1995) and Roth (1995) treat the unobserved value
 as a third value, and no relation to the true value of the attribute is assumed. They show that
several non-monotonic reasoning phenomena can be explained through learning when using this
approach.
3.1 Reasoning
Our denition of the deduction task is based on the model-theoretic denition of the implication
relation j=. That is, f j=  if and only if every model of f is also a model of . Since the notion
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of a total model is dierent than that of a partial model, we need to study the semantics of the
implication relation with respect to partial assignments.
The denition of a model can be extended to f0; 1; g
n
, using the interpretations given above.
A partial assignment x 2 f0; 1; g
n
is a p-model of W if and only if W
p
(x) = 1, for p 2 fa; e; ug,
depending on the interpretation we favor. Likewise we dene implication with respect to partial
assignments: Let  be a Boolean function. We say that W p-implies  (W j=
p
) if every p-model
of W is also a p-model of  (where p 2 fa; e; ug). As the following theorem shows the connectives
j= and j=
p
are equivalent, and the semantics so dened preserve the denitions for total models.
We therefore use j= in the rest of the paper.
Theorem 3.1 Let W; be Boolean functions and p 2 fa; e; ug. Then, W j=  if and only if
W j=
p
.
Proof: Assume rst that W j= . Let x 2 f0; 1; g
n
such that W
e
(x) = 1. Then, there exists an
extension x
0
2 f0; 1g
n
of x such that W (x
0
) = 1. From the assumption, (x
0
) = 1 and therefore

e
(x) = 1. Similarly, let x 2 f0; 1; g
n
such that W
u
(x) = 1. Then, for all extensions x
0
2 f0; 1g
n
of x, W (x
0
) = 1. Therefore, all those extensions satisfy (x
0
) = 1 and we have that 
u
(x) = 1.
Finally, let x 2 f0; 1; g
n
such that W
a
(x) = 1. Then, the unique 0-padded extension x
0
2 f0; 1g
n
of x satises W (x
0
) = 1. From the assumption, (x
0
) = 1 and therefore 
a
(x) = 1. We have shown
that W j=
p
 for all p 2 fa; e; ug.
For the other direction, assume rst thatW j=
e
. Then, given x 2 f0; 1g
n
such thatW (x) = 1,
we can treat x as an element of f0; 1; g
n
and deduce, from the assumption, that (x) = 1.
Therefore, W j= . The same argument holds when we assume that W j=
u
. Assume now that
W j=
a
. Then, given x 2 f0; 1g
n
such that W (x) = 1, we dene x
0
2 f0; 1; g
n
by replacing all the
0 entries in x by 's. By denition, W
a
(x
0
) = 1 and therefore 
a
(x
0
) = 1, and we get that (x) = 1,
that is, W j= .
We note that our approach is dierent from several works which have studied non-standard
models in the context of reasoning (Levesque, 1984; Fagin, Halpern, and Vardi, 1995). There, in
order to solve the so-called logical omniscience problem they allow a single model to assign both 0
and 1 to a variable, thus changing the semantics. As we have shown above, our denition maintains
the usual semantics.
3.2 Computational Considerations
While the evaluation of Boolean functions is trivial for total models, model evaluation may be hard
for partial assignments. To facilitate this observation we start with the following denitions:
Denition 3.1 Given a partial assignment y 2 f0; 1; g
n
dene a corresponding term and a cor-
responding clause
 t
y
= ^
n
i=1
x
y
i
i
 c
y
= t
x
= _
n
i=1
x
1 y
i
i
where x
0
i
= x
i
, x
1
i
= x
i
, x

i
= 1, x
1 
i
= 0.
Similarly, given a clause c or term t, dene corresponding partial assignments y
c
; y
t
2 f0; 1; g
n
,
such that:
7
 (y
c
)
j
=
8
>
<
>
:
1 if x
j
2 c
0 if x
j
2 c
 otherwise
 (y
t
)
j
=
8
>
<
>
:
1 if x
j
2 t
0 if x
j
2 t
 otherwise
where (y
c
)
j
, (y
t
)
j
are the jth bits in y
c
; y
t
, respectively.
For example, if y = (1  0), then t
y
= x
1
^ x
3
, and c
y
= x
1
_ x
3
. Clearly, y
c
y
= y and c
y
c
= c and
similarly y
t
y
= y and t
y
t
= t.
The following claim is immediate from the denitions:
Claim 3.2 Let y 2 f0; 1; g
n
be a partial assignment, t a term, c a clause and f : f0; 1g
n
! f0; 1g.
Then
(1) f
u
(y) = 1 if and only if t
y
j= f .
(2) t j= f if and only if f
u
(y
t
) = 1.
(3) f
e
(y) = 0 if and only if f j= c
y
.
(4) f j= c if and only if f
e
(y
c
) = 0.
The above claim shows that unlike the pure Boolean case, where evaluating a function f on an
assignment x 2 f0; 1g
n
is easy, in general, evaluating f on a partial assignment may be hard.
If we take the universal interpretation, the claim shows that evaluating f
u
(y) is equivalent to
solving unsatisability for (t
y
^f), and therefore is easy for f that is given in a CNF representation,
but co-NP-Complete for f given in a DNF representation. On the other hand, if we take the
existential interpretation, evaluating f
e
(y) is equivalent to solving satisability for f ^ c
y
, and is
therefore easy if f is given in a DNF representation, but when f is given in a CNF representation it
is ecient only for some restricted subsets (e.g., Horn CNF formulas, 2-CNF formulas, log n-clause
CNF formulas). When using the abbreviated interpretation, evaluating f on a partial assignment
is just as easy as evaluating it on a total assignment, the unique total assignment that is equivalent
to this partial assignment.
Since the common assumption in knowledge representation and reasoning is that queries are
represented in a CNF form, when trying to evaluate a query under the existential representation we
need to make sure that we restrict ourselves to deal with queries that can be evaluated eciently.
We will show how to get around this problem by using a modied evaluation procedure.
As an aside we mention that the above discussion shows that when dealing with partial assign-
ments, classication problems (e.g., evaluating a given function on an assignment) can be viewed
as reasoning problems.
4 The Learning to Reason Framework
The Learning to Reason framework combines the interfaces to the world used by known learning
models with the reasoning task and a performance criterion suitable for it. In the basic scenario
studied in this framework, the intelligent agent is given access to its favorite learning interface, and
is also given a grace period in which it can interact with this interface and construct a representation
KB of the world W . The reasoning performance is measured only after this period, when the agent
is presented with queries  from some query language, relevant to the world, and has to answer
whether W implies . We also study a scenario in which the agent learns and reasons in an on-line
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fashion. We rst dene the type of interactions available to the agent with the world under the
partial observation assumption, and then dene the corresponding Learning to Reason tasks.
4.1 The Interface
We dene an interface to the world in the spirit of the known learning models (Valiant, 1984;
Angluin, 1988), adapted to deal with partial assignments. As mentioned above we assume that
one of the interpretations for partial assignments has been chosen, and is xed for the duration
of the learning scenario. When the interpretation is clear from the context we sometimes omit
the subscript denoting which interpretation has been chosen. When we write f(x), where f is a
Boolean function and x 2 f0; 1; g
n
is a partial assignment, we mean the value of f
e
; f
u
, or f
a
on
x, according to the interpretation chosen.
An interesting phenomenon occurs with oracles for partial assignments. Some of the oracles
become \weaker" and some become \stronger" than their total assignments counterparts, in the
sense that they supply less or more information, respectively, to the learner. This does not eect
the plausibility of the oracles which should be evaluated with respect to the situations one is trying
to model. We start by presenting the standard oracles:
The basic mode of interaction with the environment is via examples drawn according to a
distribution that governs the occurrences of instances in the world. We assume here that the
distribution is dened over f0; 1; g
n
, the collection of all partial assignments.
Denition 4.1 An Example Oracle for a function f , with respect to the probability distribution
D over f0; 1; g
n
, denoted EX
D
(f), is an oracle that when accessed, returns (x; f(x)), where x is
drawn at random according to D.
Denition 4.2 A Membership Query Oracle for a function f , denoted PMQ(f), is an oracle that
when given an input x 2 f0; 1; g
n
returns f(x). We denote the standard membership oracle, which
answers only on total vectors, by MQ(f).
Note that PMQ is a stronger oracle than MQ, since it answers all queries on total vectors and in
addition all queries on partial vectors.
Denition 4.3 An Equivalence Query Oracle for a function f , denoted EQ(f), is an oracle that
when given as input a function g, answers \Yes" if and only if f  g. If it answers \No" it supplies
a counterexample, namely, an x 2 f0; 1; g
n
such that f(x) 6= g(x). A counterexample x satisfying
f(x) = 1 (f(x) = 0) is called a positive (negative) counterexample.
The EQ oracle has more freedom than the EQ usually used when choosing the counterexamples
(and is therefore weaker), since in addition to total assignments it can supply partial assignments.
The next oracles, introduced in (Frazier and Pitt, 1993), can be thought of as using the reasoning
process itself as a source for examples.
Denition 4.4 An Entailment Membership Query Oracle for a function f , denoted EnMQ(f;Q),
is an oracle that when given as input a function g 2 Q answers \Yes" if f j= g and \No" otherwise.
Denition 4.5 An Entailment Equivalence Query Oracle for a function f , denoted EnEQ(f;Q),
is an oracle that when given as input a function g, answers \No" if and only if there exists a
counterexample in Q, namely, a function h 2 Q such that, either f 6j= h but g j= h (a negative
counterexample), or f j= h but g 6j= h (a positive counterexample). When it answers \No" it also
supplies the counterexample.
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We note that EnEQ(f;Q) actually checks the equivalence of f and g relative to Q. In fact,
EnEQ(f;Q) checks the equivalence of the least upper bounds of g and f in Q. See (Selman
and Kautz, 1996; Khardon and Roth, 1994b) for denitions and discussion of least upper bounds.
Familiarity with this concept is not needed in the rest of this paper.
These are, of course, not all the oracles that can be dened, but rather those oracles that will
be used in the rest of this paper. For example, in (Greiner and Schuurmans, 1992), an \entailment
example oracle" is dened, which draws a query according to some probability distribution, and
provides the right classication for it. In general, any reasonable way of interaction with the
environment can be considered here.
In a particular learning scenario the agent may access a subset of the available oracles. We
abstract this fact by dening the interface:
Denition 4.6 We denote by I(f) the interface available to the learner when learning f . This
can be any subset of the oracles dened above, and might depend on some xed but arbitrary and
unknown distribution D over the instance space f0; 1; g
n
.
The agent interacts with its environment while learning, via I(f), and while reasoning, via the
queries presented to it. The following class of queries plays an important role in our results:
Denition 4.7 The class Q
C
of common queries consists of Boolean functions with the following
property: Every  2 Q
C
has a CNF representation, in which every clause is either (1) of size
 log n or (2) a Horn-clause (contains at most one positive literal) or (3) a k-quasi-Horn clause
(contains at most k positive literals).
4.2 The Learning to Reason Task
As in the known learning models we distinguish between Learning to Reason in a \batch" type
scenario, and \on-line" Learning to Reason.
To simplify notation, we assume from now on that all the functions discussed can be represented,
in the corresponding representation class, with size polynomial in n (the number of variables), for
some xed polynomial.
In the batch scenario, the algorithm interacts with the environment, via I(f), in order to acquire
the knowledge for answering future queries. The performance of the algorithm is measured only
after some \grace period", that must be of length polynomial in the size of the world description
and in the quality of its performance, when it is required to decide, without further interaction
with the world, if some query is entailed by f .
Denition 4.8 An algorithm A is an Exact Learn to Reason (E-L2R) algorithm for the reasoning
problem (F ;Q), if there exists a polynomial p() such that for all f 2 F , given access to I(f), A
runs in time p(n) and then, when presented with any query  2 Q, A runs in time p(n), does not
access I(f), and answers \Yes" if and only if f j= .
When a probability distribution governs the occurrence of instances in the world we somewhat
relax the requirements using the following restriction:
Denition 4.9 The query  is called (W; )-fair if either W   or Prob
D
[W n ] > .
The intuition behind this denition is that in case that W 6j=  but the weight of W outside 
is very small, we may allow the algorithm to err (and answer that W j= ). When W and D are
clear from the context we will say that  is -fair.
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Denition 4.10 An algorithm A is a Probably Approximately Correct Learn to Reason (PAC-
L2R) algorithm for the reasoning problem (F ;Q), if there exists a polynomial p(; ; ) such that for
any probability distribution D over f0; 1; g
n
, for all f 2 F , on input ; , and given access to
I(f), A runs in time p(n; 1=; 1=) and then with probability at least 1 , when presented with any
(f; )-fair query  2 Q, A runs in time p(n; 1=; 1=), does not access I(f), and answers \Yes" if
and only if f j= .
In the batch scenario above we did not allow access to I(f) while in the query answering phase.
In the on-line version however, we consider a query  presented to the algorithm as if presented
by the oracle. Thus, a reasoning error may supply the algorithm a counterexample which in turn
can be used to improve its future reasoning behavior. We allow the L2R algorithm to access I(f)
during this update, but not while answering a query. The following oracle is used to model the
learning interface for the on-line scenario.
Denition 4.11 A Reasoning Query Oracle for a function f and a propositional language Q,
denoted RQ(f;Q), is an oracle that when accessed performs the following protocol with a learning
agent A. (1) The oracle picks an arbitrary query  2 Q and returns it to A. (2) The agent A
answers \Yes" or \No" according to its belief with regard to the truth of the statement f j= .
(3) If A's answer is correct then the oracle says \Correct". If the answer is wrong the oracle
answers \Wrong". We call the oracle a Reasoning Query Oracle with Counterexamples, denoted
RQC(f;Q), if when f 6j=  and a reasoning mistake is made, it supplies a counterexample (i.e.,
x 2 f n  where x 2 f0; 1; g
n
).
When learning, the algorithm is charged one mistake each time the reasoning query is answered
incorrectly, and a successful learner should make a small number of mistakes.
Denition 4.12 An algorithm A is a Mistake Bound Learn to Reason (MB-L2R) algorithm for
the reasoning problem (F ;Q), if A interacts with the reasoning oracle RQ(f;Q), and there exists a
polynomial p() such that for all f 2 F , (1) A runs in time p(n) (on each query) and answers \Yes"
or \No" according to its belief with regard to the truth of the statement f j= , without accessing
I(f), (2) then runs in time p(n) before it is ready for the next query (possibly, with accessing I(f)),
and (3) for every (arbitrary innite) sequence of queries, A makes no more than p(n) mistakes.
5 Reasoning with Partial Assignments
In this section we study knowledge representations that support ecient reasoning, and are suit-
able for an agent that interacts with its environment via partial assignments. As in the general
case (when the interaction is via total assignments), formula-based representations do not support
ecient reasoning. Thus, we resort to model based representations. However, given the type of
interface we assume, it seems more plausible to search for a representation which consists of partial
models. We start by discussing the notion of model based representations and presenting some of
the technical details required. We then move on to dene and study partial model based represen-
tations. Indeed, we show that it is unlikely that a simple partial assignment interaction can yield
a total model based representation, justifying the use of partial model based representations.
5.1 Reasoning with Models
We have given a model-theoretic denition of the implication relation j=. The algorithm MBR,
described in Figure 1 uses this denition in a straightforward way: it maintains a set of models
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Algorithm MBR( ; ):
Test Set: A set    W of possible assignments.
Test: If there is an element x 2   such that (x) = 0, return \No". Otherwise,
return \Yes".
Figure 1: MBR: Model-Based Reasoning
   W  f0; 1g
n
as its knowledge base. To decide whether W j=  it checks, for all the models
z 2  , whether (z) = 1. If for some z, (z) = 0, it says \No"; otherwise it says \Yes".
By denition, if   = W this approach yields correct deduction, but representing W by explicitly
holding all the possible models of W is not plausible. A model based approach becomes feasible
if one can make correct inferences when working with a small subset of models. Some results
on this line have been obtained (Kautz, Kearns, and Selman, 1995; Khardon and Roth, 1994b).
In particular, previous work in (Khardon and Roth, 1994b) (using ideas from (Bshouty, 1995))
identied a small set of models, called the set of characteristic models of W , that supports correct
reasoning. We briey describe some of the relevant results we will need, culminating in Theorem 5.1
that identies the models that are needed for the algorithm MBR to be correct and ecient.
Denition 5.1 (Order) We denote by  the usual partial order on f0; 1g
n
, the one induced by
the order 0 < 1. That is, for x; y 2 f0; 1g
n
, x  y if and only if 8i; x
i
 y
i
. For an assignment
b 2 f0; 1g
n
we dene x 
b
y if and only if x  b  y  b, where  denotes the XOR operation
(bitwise addition modulo 2). As with other order relations, x 
b
y can also be written as y 
b
x,
and if x 
b
y and x 6= y we write x <
b
y.
Intuitively, if b
i
= 0 then the order relation on the ith bit is the normal order; if b
i
= 1, the order
relation is reversed and we have that 1 <
b
i
0.
Denition 5.2 The monotone extension of f with respect to b is:
M
b
(f) = fx j x 
b
z; for some z 2 fg:
Denition 5.3 A set B is a basis for f if f =
V
b2B
M
b
(f). B is a basis for a class of functions
F if it is a basis for all the functions in F .
It is known (Bshouty, 1995; Khardon and Roth, 1994b) that there are classes of functions
which share the same small basis. In particular, the class of common queries dened above has a
polynomial size basis B
c
, and the set B
H
k
= fu 2 f0; 1g
n
j weight(u)  n   kg is a basis for the
class of k-quasi-Horn functions.
Denition 5.4 Let F be a class of functions, and let B be a set of assignments in f0; 1g
n
. For
W 2 F we dene the set   =  
B
W
of characteristic models to be the set of all minimal assignments
of W with respect to the basis B. Formally,
 
B
W
= [
b2B
fz 2 min
b
(W )g;
where
min
b
(W ) = fz j z 2 W; such that 8y 2 W; z 6>
b
yg:
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Algorithm Lazy-MBR( ; ):
Test Set: A set   of partial satisfying assignments.
Test: Given a CNF query , if there is an element x 2   which falsies one of
the clauses in , deduce that f 6j= ; Otherwise, f j= .
Figure 2: Lazy-MBR: Reasoning with Partial Models
Using these denitions we can identify the models that are needed for the algorithm MBR:
Theorem 5.1 (Khardon and Roth, 1994b) Let W 2 F ,  2 G and let B be a basis for G.
Then W j=  if and only if for every u 2  
B
W
; (u) = 1.
5.2 Reasoning with Partial Models
We next consider whether partial assignments can be used in a similar way. We start by charac-
terizing a useful set of partial models which is derived from partial views of characteristic models.
For any xed k, there are
 
n
k

subsets of size k of the n variables. Given an element x 2 f0; 1g
n
and a subset I of k variables, the projection of x on I is the partial model v dened by: v
i
= x
i
,
for all x
i
2 I , and v
i
=  otherwise. Let   =  
B
f
be the set of characteristic models, and x B
to be the basis for a class which includes k-CNF. (The basis B
H
k
, of size O(n
k
) is sucient, but
there is a smaller basis, composed of a (n; k)-universal set (Naor and Naor, 1993).) Projecting all
the elements of   on each of these subsets we get a set of j j
 
n
k

partial models.
Denition 5.5 Let   =  
B
f
be the set of characteristic models. Then the set of all projections of
elements of   on subsets of size k is denoted by  
B
f jk
.
Figure 2 describes the algorithm Lazy-MBR used for reasoning with partial models. The
algorithm keeps partial assignments in its knowledge base, and assumes that the queries are given
in CNF form. When it receives a CNF query , the algorithm checks whether one of the partial
assignments in its knowledge base falsies one of the clauses in . If it nds such a partial model,
it says \No" and otherwise it says \Yes".
Note that the algorithm is slightly dierent from a normal model based algorithm MBR. The
latter, when given a query and an assignment, will try to evaluate the query on this assignment
to test whether the assignment satises the query. Since this may be hard for partial assignments,
the lazy algorithm only tests for direct falsication of clauses in the query, and otherwise gives up.
As the following theorem shows, if the knowledge base consists of the appropriate set of partial
assignments, the lazy algorithm is guaranteed to succeed.
Theorem 5.2 The algorithm Lazy-MBR, when using the set  
B
f jk
, is correct for all queries  2 k-
CNF.
Proof: Clearly, if f j= , model based reasoning answers correctly. Assume therefore that f 6j= .
Theorem 5.1 implies that there exists a total model z 2  
B
f
such that (z) = 0. In particular, since
 is a k-CNF, one of its clauses C
z
must be falsied by z. That is C
z
(z) = 0. Now consider the
element z
0
which is the projection of z on the variables in C
z
. Clearly z
0
is in  
B
f jk
and C
z
(z
0
) = 0.
So the lazy model based algorithm will answer \No" due to z
0
, and is therefore correct.
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x1
x
2
x
1
x
3
x
1
x
4
x
2
x
3
x
2
x
4
x
3
x
4

1
= 0000 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 00

2
= 0101 01 00 0 1 10 1 1 0 1

3
= 1110 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 10 1 0

4
= 0100 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
Figure 3: Projection Example
The previous theorem shows that given  
B
f
we can generate a new model based representation,
 
B
f jk
, by projecting on all possible subsets of size k of the variables. It is interesting to ask whether
the projection retains all of the information in  
B
f
, so that one can reconstruct it from  
B
f jk
. If true,
this may enable us to answer a wider class of queries, in case  
B
f
originally supported deduction
also with queries from outside k-CNF, e.g., all common queries. The following claim shows this is
not the case.
Claim 5.3 The set  
B
f
cannot be reconstructed from  
B
f jk
. Furthermore,  
B
f jk
does not retain all
the information needed in order to answer general queries supported by  
B
f
.
Proof: We prove the claim by exhibiting an example in which it is impossible to decide which of
two sets of models created  
B
f jk
. Let n = 4, k = 2,  
(3)
= f
1
; 
2
; 
3
g and  
(4)
=  
(3)
[ f
4
g, where

1
= 0000, 
2
= 0101, 
3
= 1110 and 
4
= 0100. Figure 3 shows the projections of elements in  
(4)
on subsets of size 2. The rst three rows in the gure show all the projections of the elements in
 
(3)
. Since  
B
f jk
is a set, and all the elements in the forth line already appear in the previous lines,
we get that it is impossible to decide whether  
B
f jk
is a projection of  
(3)
or  
(4)
. However, these
two sets yield dierent reasoning behavior, when the queries are not taken from 2-CNF.
For example, consider the functions f = f
1
g [ f
2
g [ f
3
g and g = f
1
g [ f
2
g [ f
3
g [ f
4
g
whose model based representation is  
(3)
and  
(4)
, respectively. Clearly, these functions respond
dierently to the reasoning query  = (x
1
_ x
2
_ x
3
_ x
4
) 2 4-CNF, but this query cannot be
answered using  
B
f jk
. This shows that  
B
f j2
does not support correct reasoning with queries in 4-
CNF, and implies that the additional knowledge that  
(3)
is in fact a set consisting of characteristic
models does not help the reconstruction.
Theorem 5.2 provides a polynomial procedure, as long as the original set   is of polynomial size
and k is a constant. It would be desirable to relax the restriction on k, so that some dependency
on n is possible. For example, when using  
B
c
f
, Theorem 5.1 implies that we can reason correctly
with logn-CNF queries. However, the previous technique of projecting on all subsets does not work
here since it creates too many partial assignments. The question is whether there is another way
to project the assignments in  
B
f
, so that a polynomial number of partial assignments is created,
and the reasoning performance is correct.
Clearly, in order to answer all the queries that are disjunctions of size k we need to have, or be
able to generate, all projections of the elements in  
B
f
on subsets of this size. One such projection
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trivially exists, the projection over the set of all variables. We are looking, however, for sets of
variables that are considerably smaller than n, since those are the elements we would like to keep in
the representation. (Even though, we are willing to keep partial assignments that are longer than
the queries, as long as they are not too long, and support correct reasoning.)
We call these sets of variables, on which we project the elements of  
B
f
, windows of variables.
Unfortunately, as we show below, small windows are too restrictive.
We say that a window r
1
covers window r
2
if r
2
 r
1
. Notice that in this case, we can answer
queries on variables from the window r
2
using the projection over r
1
. Let R be a set of windows,
and let L
k
denote the set of
 
n
k

windows of size k.
Claim 5.4 If the largest window in R is smaller than
p
n then either jRj  n
k=2
or R does not
cover all the windows in L
k
.
Proof: If the largest window in R is of size m, then every window in R covers at most
 
m
k

windows
of size k. Since m <
p
n, the number of windows we need in order to cover all the
 
n
k

windows of
size k is at least:
N =
 
n
k

 
m
k

>
p
n
k
= n
k=2
:
The last two claims suggest that model based reasoning with partial assignments is inherently
limited. We can reason as long as the queries are in k-CNF for constant k but cannot go beyond
that. While this might seem too strong a limitation, it may still explain some part of our common
sense abilities where one is able to verify the validity of simple statements very well, but has
diculties with more elaborate statements.
On the positive side, we have shown in this section that even with the additional limitation of
using only a partial model based representation, we can support more reasoning than when using
the traditional formula based representation. Clearly, reasoning with respect to k-CNF queries is,
in general, intractable, when using a CNF representation of f . In the next section we discuss the
question of how to acquire model based representations.
6 L2R with Partial Assignments
In this section we present the Learning to Reason results of this paper. The results show that we
can reason with respect to worlds for which the Learning to Classify problem is intractable and
for which the traditional reasoning problem is intractable, exhibiting the utility of the Learning to
Reason framework.
We present results that use various types of oracles, all of which provide only partial information
about the environment. We assume throughout the section that one of the interpretations for partial
assignments has been chosen, and will be xed for the duration of the learning scenario.
6.1 A Sampling Approach
We rst show that a simple sampling approach to reasoning, analyzed for total models in (Khardon
and Roth, 1994a), works for partial assignments as well. The main dierence is that, for partial
assignments, the problem of model evaluation may be computationally hard (Claim 3.2). Therefore
we have to restrict attention to queries that can be evaluated in polynomial time.
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Let Q
E
be a class of functions that can be evaluated in polynomial time on partial assignments.
Notice that this class depends on the interpretation of the partial assignments. For the existential
interpretation, this class includes all DNF formulas, Horn CNF formulas, 2-CNF formulas, and
logn-clause CNF formulas, but not general CNF representations.
The algorithm Sample and Reason rst takes a sample of size m =
1

(ln jQ
E
j+ ln
1

) examples
from EX
D
(W ). Let   be the set of positive examples sampled. Then, whenever presented with a
query, the algorithm uses   and the algorithm MBR to answer the query, where model evaluation
is done according to the appropriate interpretation.
A simple probabilistic argument yields the learning result. Let  2 Q
E
be an -fair query, and
assume that W 6j= , then the probability that no example x in   is such that (x) = 0 is at most
(1  )
m
 e
 (ln jQ
E
j+ln
1

)


jQ
E
j
. The probability that such an event happens for any query in Q
E
is therefore at most . Observing that if W j=  a model based reasoning algorithm cannot make
a mistake on  (since it cannot nd a counterexample which does not exist) we get the following
theorem:
Theorem 6.1 The algorithm Sample and Reason is a PAC-L2R algorithm for the reasoning prob-
lem (F ;Q
E
) for any class F .
The sampling result presented above may be used to motivate an approach that views the
interaction with the agent's environment as an integral part of the reasoning process; with few
assumptions and using the most basic interface between the agent and its environment, the L2R
algorithm can support more than can be achieved by combining a traditional learning and reasoning
algorithms. The result above implies that we can learn to reason for arbitrary world functions under
the restriction that queries are -fair and can be evaluated eciently. Later in this section we relax
these requirements.
6.2 Relations Among Oracles
Before presenting more learning results we discuss the relations among several oracles that have
been dened.
Lemma 6.2 The oracle PMQ(W ) for the existential interpretation can be simulated eciently by
the oracle EnMQ(W; disjunctions), and vice versa.
Proof: The lemma follows from the relations pointed out in Claim 3.2. Given a partial assignment
y presented to PMQ we present the clause c
y
(Denition 3.1) to EnMQ(W; disjunctions) and
invert the (yes/no) answer received. The correctness follows from part (3) of Claim 3.2, namely,
W j= c
y
i W
e
(y) = 0. On the other hand, given a query c presented to EnMQ(W; disjunctions),
we present the partial assignment y
c
to PMQ and invert the answer. Correctness follows from
part (4) of Claim 3.2, namely, that W j= c i W
e
(y
c
) = 0. Clearly, in both cases the simulation is
ecient.
It is also easy to see that the oracles RQ(W;Q), and EnEQ(W;Q) are closely related. Namely
RQ is, in some sense, an on-line version of EnEQ; if the learning algorithm has a hypothesis h
that it presents to EnEQ then, the counterexamples returned by EnEQ are exactly those queries
on which the algorithm will err, if presented by RQ. Thus, the information given to the learning
algorithm is the same in both cases. A more subtle relation exists between EnMQ and RQ in
cases where the query class of RQ is restricted in a way that it must present the queries that the
algorithm is interested in asking itself. In this case one can use RQ instead of EnMQ. We make
use of all these relations in the following results.
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6.3 L2R with k-CNF queries
While the class of k-CNF queries is expressive, the implication relation for this class can be captured
by simple enumeration. Namely, it is sucient to know the implication relation for disjunctions of
size  k and these can be easily combined to nd the correct answer for any k-CNF expression.
This follows from the fact that (for any W; c
1
; c
2
) if W 6j= c
1
^ c
2
then either W 6j= c
1
or W 6j= c
2
.
Therefore, given a CNF expression one can check the implication for every disjunction in it and
answer \No" if one of these disjunctions is not implied by W . The crucial point, observed and
utilized previously in (Moses and Tennenholtz, 1993), is that the number of disjunctions of size  k
is bounded by 3
k
 
n
k

and is therefore polynomial for constant k.
Using this observation we can present two L2R algorithms, that given access to EnMQ(W; k-
disjunctions) solve the reasoning problem (F ; k-CNF), for any class F .
The rst algorithm, A-IMP runs through the list of all k-disjunctions and uses EnMQ(W; k-
disjunctions) to collect a list of all k-disjunctions c such that W j= c. Then, given a query
 = c
1
^c
2
: : :^c
m
, the algorithm says \Yes" (W j= ) if and only if all the disjunctions c
1
; c
2
; : : : ; c
m
in  are in this list. The second algorithm, A-NIMP also runs through the list of all k-disjunctions,
but uses EnMQ(W; k-disjunctions) to collect a list of all k-disjunctions c such thatW 6j= c. Then,
given a query  = c
1
^ c
2
: : : ^ c
m
, the algorithm says \No" (W 6j= ) if and only if at least one of
the disjunctions c
1
; c
2
; : : : ; c
m
in  are in its list. We have:
Claim 6.3 Both A-IMP and A-NIMP are E-L2R algorithms for the reasoning problem (F ; k-CNF)
for any class F . The number of queries the algorithms make is bounded by 3
k
 
n
k

.
For any W let N(W ) be the number of disjunction of size  k which are not implied by W :
N(W ) =j fd j d has at most k literals and W 6j= dg j :
Similarly, we denote by P (W ) the size of the complement set:
P (W ) =j fd j d has at most k literals and W j= dg j :
Clearly, both N(W ) and P (W ) are smaller than the number of k-disjunctions.
The two algorithms presented above can be converted to on-line L2R algorithms, yielding a
more natural view of the reasoning process as well as better bounds on the number of queries
required. An on-line version for A-IMP proceeds as follows. Start with the empty list and initially
predict \No". If a mistake is made (that is, W j= ) add all the clauses in  to the list. Reasoning
is done as above; say \Yes" i all the clauses in  are in the list. Clearly, this algorithm never
makes mistakes when W 6j= , and the number of mistakes it makes is bounded by P (W ).
Claim 6.4 There exists a MB-L2R algorithm for the reasoning problem (F ; k-CNF). The algorithm
uses RQ(W; k-CNF) and the number of mistakes it makes is bounded by P (W ).
In order to understand the on-line version of A-NIMP it is useful to think of the problem
in terms of concept learning. Consider the set of k-disjunctions as a new set of features a
1
; : : :a
r
(r < 3
k
 
n
k

). Notice that the concept of \not implied byW" is a disjunction over the a
i
's, consisting
of exactly those a
i
's in the list maintained by A-NIMP. To see that, consider a query  as a list
of its \active" (i.e., present) clauses. Queries that are not implied by W can be viewed as positive
examples to the target concept, and queries that are implied by W as negative examples. The
learning of this disjunction over the a
i
's can be done in an on-line fashion, essentially using Blum's
(1992) algorithm for monotone disjunctions. Start with the empty list and initially predict \No".
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Algorithm A-OL-NIMP
1. Initialize G = ;.
2.  RQ(W;Q)
3. Use Lazy-MBR(G;) to answer the query W j= .
4. If \wrong" then:
if answered No then for all z 2 G and for all c 2  if z falsies c then remove z from G.
if answered Yes then for all c 2 , compute the assignment y
c
2 f0; 1; g
n
(as in Deni-
tion 3.1), and if it was never added to G before then add y
c
to G.
5. GoTo 2
Figure 4: The Algorithm A-OL-NIMP
When presented with a query  say \No" if and only if at least one of the clauses in  is in the
list. If a mistake is made when W 6j= , add all the clauses a
i
in  to the list. If a mistake is made
when W j= , erase from the disjunction those a
i
's (clauses) which appear in . It is easy to see
that this algorithm learns the required disjunction over the a
i
's.
However, by viewing the knowledge representation maintained by the on-line algorithm as a
disjunction over attributes (each corresponding to a clause), we lose some of the structure of the
reasoning problem. To remedy that we now present a dierent on-line version of the algorithm
A-NIMP that uses a model based representation as its knowledge representation, and reasons using
the Lazy-MBR algorithm. In addition, the algorithm yields further savings in the number of
queries used.
To understand the algorithm notice rst that instead of keeping the k-disjunction c in the
representation we can keep the partial assignment y
c
. Verifying whether the k-disjunction c appears
in the query  is equivalent to the lazy evaluation of  on y
c
. When every clause is represented as
a separate feature, and when c; c
0
are disjunctions (with no more than k literals) such that c
0
j= c,
we still need to keep both. But, when using a model based representation it is sucient to keep y
c
since clearly also c
0
(y
c
) = 0.
The algorithm A-OL-NIMP, described in Figure 4, maintains a model based representation
G, initially empty, and uses the lazy evaluation algorithm Lazy-MBR (Figure 2) to respond to
queries presented by RQ. Let  = c
1
^ c
2
: : : ^ c
m
be the CNF representation of a query supplied
by RQ, and assume that the algorithm makes a mistake on . When W 6j=  and the algorithm
responded \Yes", the algorithm produces a set of assignments and adds them to G. For each c
i
2 ,
the algorithm produces the assignment y
c
i
as in Denition 3.1. (For example, if c = x
1
_ x
3
then
y
c
= (0  1).) The assignment is added to G only if it was never considered before. When W j= 
and the algorithm responded \No", the algorithm removes from G the assignments that caused the
mistake.
It is important to notice that, while the algorithm uses partial assignments, the following
theorem is independent of the interpretation of the partial assignments. The reason is that it
does not receive any examples from the oracles; those are produced internally by the algorithm.
Namely, the oracle used, RQ, does not depend on the interpretation. A similar phenomenon occurs
in Section 6.5, where entailment oracles are discussed.
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Theorem 6.5 For any class F of Boolean functions, the algorithm A-OL-NIMP, when given access
to RQ(W; k-CNF), is a MB-L2R algorithm for the reasoning problem (F ; k-CNF). The number of
mistakes A-OL-NIMP makes is bounded by minfm N(W ); 3
k
 
n
k

g, where m is the maximal number
of clauses in a query presented to the algorithm.
Proof: It is sucient to keep in G a (useful) counterexample for every disjunction c with up to
k variables such that W 6j= c.
For every mistake the algorithm makes when W 6j= , there must be a c 2  such that W 6j= c.
Whenever a mistake like this happens the algorithm adds an assignment y
c
for every disjunction
c 2 . At least one of these assignments is a \good counterexample", in the sense that if falsies
the disjunction c 2  such that W 6j= c, and is thus useful for the Lazy-MBR algorithm. (Notice
that by \falsifying a disjunction" we mean falsifying all the variables in the disjunction; this is
obviously true by the construction.)
The way the assignments are generated guarantees that the algorithm will not make a mistake
on any query which contains this clause, and since the algorithm uses Lazy-MBR for reasoning,
correct counterexamples are never removed from G. We therefore get a bound of N(W ) for the
number of mistakes in which the algorithm says \Yes" instead of \No". Every such mistake is
responsible for producing at most (m 1) mistakes of the other type. Since the algorithm introduces
every clause at most once, we get the claimed mistake bound.
Corollary 6.6 For any class F of Boolean functions, there is a MB-L2R algorithm for the reason-
ing problem (F ; k-CNF) that uses RQ(W; k-CNF), and makes at most 2 minfm N(W ); P (W )g
mistakes, where m is the maximal number of clauses in a query presented to the algorithm.
Proof: The algorithm simply alternates between the algorithm used in Theorem 6.5 and the
algorithm used in Claim 6.4. When the currently used algorithm makes a mistake we update its
representation and go on to use the other algorithm. This clearly results in the stated mistake
bound.
We note that for the universal and the abbreviated interpretations, it is possible to avoid the
dependence on m in the above bound, by using RQC instead of RQ. For these interpretations the
counterexample supplied by the oracle are useful
2
for model based reasoning.
The dependence of the mistake bound can be reduced in a dierent way, which holds for all
the interpretations. This is done by converting the algorithm A-OL-NIMP to an attribute ecient
algorithm using the Winnow algorithm (Littlestone, 1988), similar to what is done in (Blum, 1992).
The resulting mistake bound is of the form logm N(W ). The knowledge representation used by
the new algorithm is not a list of models any more. Instead, a weighted sum of models is used for
reasoning, where the weights are a function of the learning history.
To summarize, we mention again that the results of this section show that one can learn to
reason even when the learning problem and the reasoning problem are hard. In particular, if W
is an arbitrary Boolean circuit, the learning problem is known to be hard (independent of the
representation (Kearns and Valiant, 1994)), and the reasoning problem is also hard, regardless of
the class of queries (Cook, 1971). However, by restricting the queries to k-CNF we show that one
can learn to reason.
2
This does not hold for the existential interpretation since the counterexample can be adversarially chosen, such
that Lazy-MBR will make repeated mistakes on the same query.
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6.4 Using Stronger Oracles
The results of Section 5.2 suggest that the only way to improve the results we have shown so far, and
reason with classes of queries that are wider than k-CNF, is to use total models in the representation.
On the other hand, since the interface may supply short examples, and reconstruction is not
possible, this seems to be impossible. In order to learn to reason with more expressive queries, we
will have to use stronger oracles, which could be used to collect the set of (total) characteristic
models  . Next we use a learning to reason result that was established in the context of total
models. The result shows that the set of characteristic models can be learned and that this yields
a learning to reason result. Recall that by Q
C
we denote the class of all common queries.
Theorem 6.7 (Khardon and Roth, 1994a) There is a MB-L2R algorithm, Ex-L2R-DNF, for
the problem (DNF;Q
C
). The algorithm interacts with the oracles RQC(W;Q
C
) and MQ(W )
restricted to total models, maintains a model based representation G  W (where W is the hidden
world function), and when presented a query by RQC, it responds using G and the model based
algorithm MBR.
In the following we show that the same task can be performed using the appropriate partial assign-
ments oracles.
Theorem 6.8 There is a MB-L2R algorithm for the reasoning problem (F ;Q
C
), for any class F
and for all interpretations of partial assignments.
(1) For the abbreviated and universal interpretations, the algorithm uses the oracles RQC(W;Q
C
)
and MQ(W ).
(2) For the existential interpretation the algorithm uses the oracles RQ(W;Q
C
) and PMQ(W ).
The algorithm is polynomial in the DNF size of W and the size of the queries presented to it.
Proof: We show that the partial assignments oracles available here are as powerful as the total
assignments oracles used in Theorem 6.7. We can therefore simulate algorithm Ex-L2R-DNF and
hence learn to reason.
Clearly, a membership query oracle for partial assignments can answer all membership queries
on total assignments. Instead of the oracle RQC for total assignments as in Ex-L2R-DNF we have
access to either RQC with partial assignments in case (1) or to RQ in case (2). Therefore, we can
use the given oracle for the purpose of interacting with the algorithm; what we need to do is to
nd a total counterexample to present to Ex-L2R-DNF when it makes a mistake.
Let  be a query on which the algorithm makes a mistake when interacting with RQ. First
note that since the algorithm performs model based reasoning, and the models in its representation
are true models of W , it must be the case that the algorithm said \Yes" whereas in fact W 6j= .
We argue by cases, according to the interpretation used. For the universal and abbreviated
interpretations, we have access to RQC. That is, whenever a mistake is made, RQC returns a
partial assignment v 2 W n  as a counterexample. In the abbreviated case, the unique 0-padded
extension is the total counterexample needed. In the universal case, by denition, v must have
an extension which falsies a disjunction d 2 . Such an extension is easy to nd by nding a
disjunction in which non of the literals is satised by v. (By denition, this extension satises W .)
For the existential interpretation, we have access to RQ, and therefore need to generate a
total counterexample on our own. As in Theorem 6.5, we generate the counterexamples using the
structure of the query . Given  = ^c
i
, we generate the partial examples y
c
i
. At least one of these
examples, v = y
c
j
, for some j, is positive for W . That is, the partial vector v is a counterexample.
Next we show how, using PMQ, and these partial examples we generate a total counterexample.
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First, using PMQ we nd v = y
c
j
which is positive for W . Then, we extend v to a total vector
which is still a counterexample. This can be done in a greedy manner, one bit at a time, using
the oracle PMQ. Let v be the counterexample from above. Then, by denition, there exists some
total example which is an extension of v and is positive for W . If there is a positive extension with
0 assigned to some bit, which is currently assigned , (use a PMQ query to test this) then we can
assign 0 to it, otherwise we can assign 1 to it.
It is important to notice that while partial assignments were introduced to model situations in
which the information available to the learner about the environment is limited, in the previous
theorem we make use of fairly strong oracles. In particular, the partial membership query oracle
PMQ is more powerful than the membership query oracleMQ. In the proof of the previous theorem
it is used in order to complete partial assignments into total assignments. While completion of
variables may be plausible in some situations, it may be more reasonable to limit the queries to a
bounded number of specied literals. We leave this for future investigation.
As above, and similar to (Khardon and Roth, 1994a) this result shows that while learning DNF
is still an open problem, it is possible to learn to reason with respect to DNF when the queries are
common.
6.5 Using Entailment Queries
We next discuss learning to reason algorithms that use entailment oracles as the interface with the
environment. Entailment oracles were introduced in Frazier and Pitt (1993) where an algorithm for
learning to classify Horn expressions is developed. As argued in (Khardon and Roth, 1994a) this
algorithm can be used as a learning to reason algorithm for the class of Horn queries and arbitrary
W (and is polynomial for a certain class of functions discussed below).
When considering entailment oracles the issue of partial assignments in the interface does not
exist. One way to enforce the interface to be partial is to assume that the equivalence entailment
oracle returns as counterexamples only functions in, say k-Horn (i.e., Horn functions with up to k
literals in a clause), and that the membership entailment oracle answers only when the function
given to it is in this class. It is not hard to see that under this restriction the algorithm by Frazier
and Pitt (1993) learns the k-Horn least upper bound of any theory, and therefore yields a Learning
to Reason algorithm that can reason with any k-Horn query. However, we would not pursue this
further here. Instead we show that if such restrictions are not made, then entailment oracles can
be used to learn the set of characteristic models, and therefore learn to reason with a larger set of
queries. However, as explained below, the two results are incomparable, since both the complexity
of the algorithms and the strength of the oracles used are incomparable.
Theorem 6.9 There is an E-L2R algorithm for the reasoning problem (F ;Q
C
), for any class F ,
when given access to EnEQ(W;Q
C
) and EnMQ(W; disjunctions). The algorithm is polynomial
in n, the size of the DNF representation of W and the size of the queries presented to it.
Proof: As in Theorem 6.8 the proof relies on simulating the oracles MQ and RQC used in
Theorem 6.7.
First note that Lemma 6.2 implies that using EnMQ(W; disjunctions) one can simulate PMQ(W ),
in the case of the existential interpretation. In particular, one can simulate MQ using EnMQ.
We now show that EnEQ can replace the oracle RQC. Recall that the algorithm maintains a set
of models G, which it uses for model based reasoning. We will use the function h = ^
b2B
_
z2G
M
b
(z)
as the hypothesis of the algorithm. When the algorithm tries to access RQC, we instead call
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EnEQ(W;Q
C
) with the hypothesis h, and receive a counterexample  2 Q
C
. We claim that only
one type of counterexample can occur. Namely, it must be the case that h j= , and W 6j= . To
prove this claim
3
, assume that h 6j= . Then, by Theorem 5.1 there is a minimal model of h such
that (x) = 0. Furthermore, x must be an element of G, since for all b 2 B, 9z 2 G such that
x 
b
z. But then since G  W we also get W 6j= .
We present  that was received from EnEQ to the algorithm, as if coming from RQC. Since
the algorithm performs model based reasoning with G, by Theorem 5.1, it will make a mistake
on . We then compute a counterexample and return it to the algorithm, along with the \No"
response. Computing the counterexample is done exactly in the same manner as in the proof of
Theorem 6.8, where PMQ for the existential interpretation is used.
Finally, note that when the algorithm stops it responds correctly to all queries  2 Q
C
. By the
denition of EnEQ, when the algorithm stops (i.e., when EnEQ returns \Yes"), W j=  i h j= ,
for all  2 Q
C
. Therefore, by Theorem 5.1, model based reasoning with G is correct.
We note that the strength of the oracles used is incomparable with those used by Frazier and
Pitt (1993). When using EnMQ, we used a \stronger" version of it, since we allowed ourselves
to ask queries that are arbitrary disjunctions, compared to Horn disjunctions used there. On the
other hand we used a \weaker" version of EnEQ since it was allowed to return counterexamples in
Q
C
, compared with Horn disjunctions used there. The results are also incomparable in complexity
since (as argued in (Khardon and Roth, 1994b)) the algorithm in Frazier and Pitt (1993) requires
time which is polynomial in the propositional Horn representation of the least upper bound of W ,
whereas Theorem 6.9 requires time polynomial in the DNF size of W , and the two are in general
incomparable. Another important dierence relates to partial assignments. As discussed in the
previous section the oracles used here, PMQ and also EnEQ can give more information than their
total-assignment counterparts. This is dierent from the algorithm of Frazier and Pitt (1993) which
always asks EnMQ queries which are shorter than the disjunctions it receives as counterexamples.
7 Conclusions
Most of the work on learning and reasoning has considered those as separate tasks, assuming that
eventually the tasks will be combined to yield intelligent behavior. However, in their current formal-
ization, both learning and reasoning problems are known to be computationally hard. Moreover, it
may not be possible to use the output of the learning stage for reasoning in a straightforward way.
The Learning to Reason framework emphasizes the role of inductive learning in achieving e-
cient reasoning, and the importance of studying reasoning and learning phenomena together.
In this paper we considered the problem of Learning to Reason when the interaction with the
world supplies only partial information. We have shown, in the context of partially observable
worlds, that the agent truly gains additional computational power in the Learning to Reason
framework. Namely, one can learn to reason even when the separately dened tasks of learning
and reasoning are hard.
In the problem considered in this paper the agent interacts with its environment using exam-
ples that are only partially specied. Its performance is measured relative to the task of logical
deduction. Namely, it has to determine whether a given query, supposed to capture the situation
at hand, is true in the world.
3
This can be traced to the fact that h j= W
B
lub
, where W
B
lub
is the least upper bound of W in Q
C
(Khardon and
Roth, 1994b). We give an argument from rst principles to avoid using the notion of least upper bounds.
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Several natural interpretations of partial assignments were considered, and it was shown that
logical deduction retains the same meaning with respect to those. The Learning to Reason tasks
were studied with respect to these interpretations.
Several of our results are based on a model based approach to reasoning. We have shown that
a knowledge base which consists of a collection of partial examples can be used to support correct
and ecient reasoning with respect to the world, and a restricted class of queries. Furthermore,
such representations can be learned, yielding a learning to reason algorithm.
We studied several interfaces of the agent with its environment that are suitable to handle
partial assignments, and have proved learning to reason results whose strength depend on the type
of interaction assumed. In particular, random partial assignments can be used to reason with
respect to -fair queries, the oracle RQ restricted to k-CNF queries can be used to reason with
respect to the same class of queries, and stronger oracles can be used to support reasoning with
respect to all common queries.
This work highlights the fact that the study of learning can be incorporated within the study
of other high level cognitive tasks and can contribute to the understanding of those tasks and
motivates the study of learning problems that arise in this way.
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